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Abstract
This paper presents a new empirical strategy for estimating the eﬀects of trade policy
on domestic factor prices when policy endogeneity is suspected. Absent income eﬀects
on factor supplies or domestic prices, the coeﬃcient on the terms of trade can provide
an unbiased estimator of the eﬀect of trade barriers on the factor distribution of income
for a small economy. In the more general case where income eﬀects are allowed for,
we provide a means to quantify and control for the possible bias. We implement our
strategy on a cross-national data set of trade policies and income shares of capital and
labor. We ﬁnd little evidence of the existence of Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects, both for the
sample as a whole as well as within cones of diversiﬁcation. Consistent with a model
of wage bargaining, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of openness on capital shares is greater for
countries with higher unionization rates.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F13, F16.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The possible existence of distributive eﬀects of policies leading to greater economic integra-
tion is one of the topics of major interest today in academic and policy circles. In the past
few years, a massive array of empirical and theoretical tools has been used to attempt to
understand the eﬀects of openness to international trade on the returns to diﬀerent factors
of production in both developing and developed countries. At the same time, a contentious
policy debate has formed around the beneﬁts and costs of greater liberalization in devel-
oping and developed economies, with the potential distributive impact of greater openness
commonly appealed to by both sides.1
The issue of whether protection harms or helps diﬀerent factors of production has been
around for quite a while. It was precisely the discussion between Frank Taussig (1927), who
believed that labor’s greater mobility helped insulate it from potential losses from interna-
tional trade, and Bertil Ohlin (1933), who held the view that labor’s scarcity implied that
it would beneﬁt from protection, that inspired the seminal work of Stolper and Samuelson
(1941)2. These debates were not purely academic, either. As Irwin (2000) has noted, the
major political justiﬁcation for the US high import tariﬀs during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century was the view that it protected high American wages against the low
wages of its European competitors.
The estimation of the eﬀects of trade policy on the domestic distribution of income poses
the formidable empirical problem of disentangling the causal eﬀects that openness can have
on factor prices from the impact that these prices have on the politico-economic equilibrium
that generates policies. Indeed, a considerable part of the literature concerned with the
1An interesting example of how diﬀering views on the same issue can be used to support contrasting policy
stances comes from the ongoing debate on the formation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Global Exchange, an international NGO that is actively involved in the anti-globalization movement, lists the
fact that “the agreement will increase poverty and inequality ”among its “Top Ten Reasons to oppose the
FTAA” (Global Exchange, 2003) In contrast, when discussing the prospects for the FTAA before a meeting
of the Americas Business Forum in Miami, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans stated the administration’s
position as follows: “President Bush believes that free trade oﬀers hope, opportunity, and expanded freedom
to people in the grip of poverty” (Department of State, 2003)
2See Samuelson, 1994.
2relationship between trade policies and income distribution postulates that domestic income
distribution aﬀects policy determination (see Magee (1980), Rogowski (1987) and Beaulieu
(2002) for some examples). The common approach of using instrumental variables to resolve
this problem has several pitfalls, among which are the lack of an abundant supply of sources
of exogenous variation, the possible independent eﬀect that instruments may have on the
variable of interest, and the small-sample bias of instrumental variables estimators3.
This paper presents an alternative empirical strategy for estimating the eﬀects of trade
policies on domestic income distribution. Our strategy relies on the result that in a broad
class of models of international trade, the elasticity of the return of a factor of production with
respect to tariﬀs should be equal to its elasticity with respect to the prices of importables.
Therefore, the coeﬃcient on import prices in a regression with factor prices as a dependent
variable enables us to estimate the eﬀect of trade policies on domestic income distribution.
If the economy in question is suﬃciently small so as to rule out its impact on international
prices, then we can obtain a consistent estimate of the coeﬃcient of interest (the coeﬃcient
on the policy variable) by using the estimate on the exogenous variable (the price variable).
Figure 1 illustrates the basis of our strategy. In it we show the eﬀect that changes in
prices and tariﬀs have on the derivation of labor demand. Labor demand is derived in a
competitive market by tracing out the desired use of labor by competitive ﬁrms at diﬀerent
wage rates. An increase in prices from P1 to P2 leads to a shift outwards of the value of
the marginal product of labor and thus an increase in the desired level of employment at a
given wage rate w0 from LD
1 (w0) to LD
2 (w0). But this is exactly the same eﬀect that will
be generated by an increase of the tariﬀ rate from t1 to t2,w h e r et2
t1 = P2
P1
4.A s t h e l a b o r
demand schedule that is generated by t2 (given P1) is the same as that which is generated
by P2 (given t1) then so will be the equilibrium factor prices. Figure 1 suggests that if we
are doubtful of our capacity to estimate the eﬀect of t on domestic factor prices because of
possible simultaneity problems, we think of estimating the eﬀect of P.
Figure 1 also makes evident two potential pitfalls of this strategy. One comes from the
possible endogeneity of P itself. If P is endogenous, then the eﬀect of P on factor prices will
3See Rigobón and Rodrik (2004) for a discussion of these problems as well as a new approach based on
identiﬁcation through heteroskedasticity.
4For convenience, we deﬁne t as one plus the ad-valorem tariﬀ rate on importables.
3be no easier to estimate than that of t, leaving little value added to our approach. We will
adress this problem by restricting the estimation to small countries, for which the assumption
of exogenous terms of trade is quite appealing. A second pitfall comes form the possibility
that P may cause subsequent shifts in t.I f t moves in tandem with P,t h e ni tw i l lb e
econometrically diﬃcult to disentangle their eﬀects. However, as long as we believe that
exogeneity of P is a tenable assumption, it will be easy to verify whether this correlation
exists in practice, and whether the necessary conditions for our estimation approach are
validated.
Additional complications can arise if factor supplies are income-elastic or if some goods
are non-traded. The reason is that tariﬀs and international prices do have non-symmetric
eﬀects on aggregate income, so that any type of income eﬀects wil introduce a wedge between
the price elasticity and the tariﬀ elasticity of factor returns. However, as we show below, it
is possible to quantify this bias and to ascertain the magnitude of the diﬀerence between the
two coeﬃcients, preserving the validity of our estimation strategy.
We illustrate our approach through empirical tests of competing theories of the relation-
ship between trade and factor prices using data on factor shares of capital and labor in 109
economies for the period between 1960 and 1999 from the United Nations’ System of National
Accounts. Using data on multilateral trade ﬂows, we are able to distinguish between countries
that control a signiﬁcant share of the market for their exports or imports and those that do
not. For the latter group, our identiﬁcation assumption enables us to use the coeﬃcient
on a country’s terms of trade to estimate the eﬀect of trade restrictions on domestic income
distribution.
Our results do not support the predictions of neoclassical trade theory. We ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on international prices in poor economies is statistically undistinguishable
from that in rich economies, so that the data do not indicate the existence of a distinction
between the eﬀect of trade that varies with a country’s capital abundance, as implied by
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. These results hold both in the complete data set as well as
in Gollin’s (2002) income shares corrected for self-employment, which are available for 25
of the economies in our sample. On the other hand, our data oﬀers suggestive evidence in
favor of the existence of an interaction between economic integration and the wage bargaining
4process: we ﬁnd that countries are more likely to see capital shares increase with openness
when their labor force is highly unionized, a result that is consistent with the predictions of
a wage-bargaining model of relative factor returns.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our key theoretical results,
establishing the conditions under which the elasticities of factor returns with respect to the
terms of trade are identical to those with respect to the terms of trade, and quantifying the
potential bias when those conditions do not hold. Section 3 develops our empirical strategy
and presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Trade and factor prices: theoretical links
The relationship between trade and factor prices in trade-theoretic models forms an extensive
body of literature that is aptly surveyed, among others, by Dixit and Norman (1980), Jones
and Neary(1984), Ethier (1984) and Feenstra (2004). We appeal to some well-known results
of this literature to establish the conditions under which our identiﬁcation assumption - that
the price and tariﬀ elasticities of factor returns are equal - holds. As we will show, these two
elasticities will be equal whenever all goods are traded and factor supplies do not depend on
income levels. When we allow for non-traded goods and income-responsive factor supplies,
the equality will break down; however, we will derive conditions which will help us to quantify
and control for the diﬀerence between these two coeﬃcients.
Let there be M factors of production and I goods. Let w = {w1...wM}0 denote the vector
of factor returns for each of the M factors of production. Likewise, let the use of each of the
M factors by industry i be captured by the vector Bi = {B1i...BMi}0. Production is given
by the vector of production functions q = {F1(B1)...FI(BI)}0, and price levels in the vector
p = {p1...pI}0. Factor supplies are given by Bs = {Bs
1,...Bs
M}0 .F i r m s a r e p r i c e - t a k e r s
and proﬁt-maximizers, and perfect competition implies free entry and zero proﬁts. The
unit cost function for industry i will be ci(w)=m i n Bi≥0 w0Bi subject to Fi(Bi)=1 .L e t
c = {c1(w)...cI(w)}0. p∗ = {p∗
1...p∗
I}0 is the vector of international prices and T = diag{t}
is an I × I diagonal matrix with one plus the ad-valorem tariﬀ rate for good i, ti on the
i-th term of the diagonal. Thus the I × 1 vector Tp∗ will give us the tariﬀ-inclusive price
of imported goods. If good i is exported in equilibrium, then ti > 0 should be taken to
5indicate an export subsidy. Equilibrium will be given by the w and q vectors that satisfy
the I zero-proﬁt conditions and the M factor market equilibrium conditions:
p = c(w) (1)
A(w)q = Bs, (2)
where A is the M × I matrix with component aij(w)=
∂cj
∂wi in the i-th row and j-th
column. (1) and (2) provide a system of M +I equations in the M + I variables w and q.5
2.1 No income eﬀects
We start out by considering the case in which all goods are tradable and factor supplies are
given. In this case Bs = {B1,...BM}0, a vector of ﬁxed factor supplies, and p = Tp.
Let us ﬁrst look at the case of ”even” technologies, where I = M so that there are as
many goods as factors. Equation (1) now deﬁnes a system of I equations in M = I variables.
The implicit function theorem implies that, if c1(w)...cI(w) are Ck−functions in RI and






Let εxy denote the elasticity of x with respect to y. Then the chain rule implies that
εwjy = εwjpiεpiy for y = {p∗
i,t i}.A spi = tip∗
i,t h e nεpip∗
i = εpiti =1 , allowing us to establish
our result6:
εwjp∗
i = εwjti, (3)
that is, the elasticity of wages with respect to trade restrictions will be the same as its
elasticity with respect to international prices. In the case of two factors of production (call
5Economies of scale can be accommodated by writing the unit cost function as c(w,q). The reasoning
presented for the I 6= M case would hold, although the sense of an equation such as (1) might be thrown into
question. Section 2.3 presents a special case in which (1) need not hold.
6Note that we have simply assumed det|A
0| 6=0instead of the more restrictive Nikaido (1972) conditions.
The reason is that for our result to hold we do not require uniqueness of w; even if there is more than one
wage vector consistent with a given price vector, equation (3) will be true for small changes in the price level
at a particular equilibrium.














which restates the familiar Stolper-Samuelson result.7 Note that (4) implies an exact linear
functional form for estimation in the Cobb-Douglas case. To see this, deﬁne capital’s share

















Since in the Cobb-Douglas case 1
α1−α2 is ﬁxed,(6) can be estimated by linear methods,
takng into account that the sign of the coeﬃcient changes according to whether the country
imports or exports good 1.
As is well known, technologies in which the number of goods diﬀers from the number of
factors have non-trivial implications for many results in international trade. Nevertheless,
equation (3) will continue to characterize the relationship between wages, trade restrictions
and international prices when N 6= I at any equilibrium in which εwjti and εwjp∗
i are well-
deﬁned. The reason is simple: when the technology is odd, (1) and (2) still provide a system
of M +I equations that can be solved for w and q.A s p∗
i and ti only enter multiplicatively
in this system, then if there is a solution to w, it can be expressed as w = w(Bs,p).A s
εpip∗
i = εpiti =1 , if it is possible to calculate εwjpi, then the chain rule can be applied to
establish that εwjp∗
i = εwjti.
This reasoning applies equally to the case of complete specialization. When the economy
is outside of the FPE set, some goods will not be produced. The zero-proﬁt conditions
for those goods now need not hold8,a n dw and q must now solve a system of M + I − I0
equations, where I0 is the set of goods that is not produced in equilibrium. There will now
be M + I − I0 unknowns: I − I0 production levels and M prices. If there is a solution for
w, it can again be expressed as w(Bs,p),w i t hεwjti = εwjp∗
i.






8They are replaced by inequalities of the form pi ≤ ci(w).
7It may well be the case, however, that it is not possible to ﬁnd a solution to the system
deﬁned by (1) and (2). This will generally be the case when I>M , as then (1) provides
as y s t e mo fI equations in M variables, which have no solution except for very special price
vectors. Obviously, our result cannot be derived in such a case, not because εwjti and εwjp∗
i
are diﬀerent, but because they do not exist. However, some authors have argued that in this
case of inexistence of equilibrium, international prices will adjust to levels consistent with
positive production of all goods (see Dixit and Norman, 1980). In such a case, I − M zero
proﬁt conditions become redundant and the remaining M conditions can be solved as before.
Even though production levels will be indeterminate, factor prices will not, and the equality
between εwjti and εwjp∗
i will be maintained.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition
Proposition 1 Let all goods be traded and factor supplies be given. Then if there is a




The equivalence between εwjti and εwjp∗
i c a nb eb r o k e ni fi n c o m el e v e l sa r ea l l o w e dt oa f -
fect domestic wages. The reason is that international prices and tariﬀ rates aﬀect income
diﬀerently: an increase in the terms of trade can shift a country’s consumption possibili-
ties set outwards, but an increase in tariﬀs cannot. In other words, the one equation in
which international prices and tariﬀs do not enter multiplicatively is that pertaining to the
determination of aggregate GDP:
Y = w0Bı + ı0ΠM
where B is an N × I matrix whose columns are the factor use vectors Bi, ı is an I ×
1 vector of ones, Π is a diagonal matrix with pi(ti − 1) in each of the i diagonal terms,
and M = D(Y,p) − q a vector of import levels, where D(Y,p) denotes aggregate economy
demand for good i.
Let us ﬁrst think about the income eﬀects that operate through factor supplies. Let
Bs= Bs(w,p,Y ).N o t e ﬁrst that whenever (1) can be solved for w then Bs has no eﬀect
8whatsoever on factor prices, and whether it depends on Y or not is irrelevant. Therefore,
if I = M and the conditions necessary for the implicit function theorem to be applied hold,
then εwjti = εwjp∗
i.
This will also be true when I>Mif it is the case that international prices are such
that there is positive production of all goods in the home country, as then the number of
linearly independent zero-proﬁt conditions reduces to M. It cannot, however, be applied
when I<M . In such a case, equilibrium w, q and Y must solve:
Tp∗ = c(w) (7)
A(w)q = Bs(w,Tp
∗,Y) (8)
Y = w0Bı + ı0ΠM. (9)
Note that if there exists a solution to this system, there also must be a solution to the
subsystem formed by the ﬁrst I + M equations for w and q as a function of Tp∗ and Y .
Therefore, it must be the case that
εwjp∗
i − εwjti = εwjY
¡
εYp ∗





∗,Y)0Bı denote domestic factor income gives us an implicit
solution for the equilibrium Y as a function of p∗
i and ti (provided of course that the conditions








Taking derivatives with respect to p∗
i and ti, subtracting, reorganizing and substituting in
(10) gives us:
εwjp∗
i = εwjti − εwjY
1
1 − FIY −
P
j P∗




where mi = P∗
i Mi/Y is the ratio of industry i imports to GDP at world prices. (12) will be
extremely important in our estimation strategy, as it allows us to quantify the potential bias
that can arise from using εwkp∗
i as an estimator of εwkti − εwlti.
We turn now to the case of income eﬀects that operate through the demand for non-
tradables. When some goods are not traded internationally, their prices become endogenous,
9and must be determined by clearing of the domestic market. (7) now becomes:
pi = ci(w) for i ∈ NT (13)
p∗
iti = ci(w) for i ∈ T,
with (8) and (9) as above, but with a new set of NT additional market clearing conditions:
Di(p,Y)=Qi for i ∈ NT. (14)
(8),(9), (13) and (14) now form a system of M+I+NT+1 equations that can be solved for the
M factor returns, I production levels, NT domestic prices and income Y . As before, the ﬁrst
M +I+NT equations can be solved for w = w(Tp∗,Y),q = q(Tp
∗,Y) and p = p(Tp∗,Y).
The above reasoning can now be applied to derive (12). The results are summarized in
Proposition 2 Assume that some goods are non-traded, with their domestic demand given
by D(Y,p), and that factor supplies depend on income according to the factor supply func-
tion Bs(w,Tp
∗,Y). Then if there is a solution for w in the system of equations given by
(8),(9), (13) and (14) and at that equilibrium εwjpi and εwjY exist, then εwjp∗











Although the model presented above is quite general, it may not encompass some cases that
can be highly relevant for the study of the relationship between factor prices and international
trade. Recent contributions to the literature have emphasized the importance of the process
of intra-ﬁrm bargaining for relative price determination (see, for example, Rodrik (1997),
Panagariya (1999), Mezetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Reddy and Dube (2000) and Skillman
(2000)). The latter three papers, for example, derive the eﬀect of trade on the solution
to a bargaining problem when an import-competing industry receives rents. However, the
solution to a Nash bargaining problem over factor returns and output levels will generally
not satisfy the assumption of cost minimization, as ﬁrm objectives will put a positive weight
on factor returns, and thus cannot be embodied in the models presented in sections 2.1 and
2.2.
10A general characterization of wage determination under non-cost minimization objectives
is outside the scope of this paper. In this discussion, we concentrate on wage-setting processes





Bi ≥ 0 (16)
wi ≥ w (17)
pi(Qi,Y) ≤ p∗
iti (18)
where wi = {wi1,...w iM} is an industry-speciﬁc wage vector and w is a vector of reservation
wages. This schematic description subsumes a number of bargaining solution such as the
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, the Kalai-Smorodinski Solution and the Utilitarian
Solution, as long as ﬁrm and union preferences can be described as functions of πi,wi and
Bi . The basic assumption is that the wage-setting process is now internal to the industry
and that diﬀerent industries can have diﬀerent wage levels. We model the ﬁrm as having
market power, as it makes little sense to think about bargaining over the distribution of rents
when there is perfect competition. Neither the zero-proﬁt condition nor the labor-market
clearing conditions are relevant any longer: it is assumed that proﬁts are greater than zero
and that the wage levels set through bargaining are high enough so as to generate equilibrium
unemployment. In this case, industry wage and employment levels are simply those that
solve (15) subject to (16)-(18). Let us ﬁrst look at the solutions where (18) is binding. In
these cases the solution for factor returns takes the form wi= wi(w,p∗
iti),s ot h a t :
εwijti = εwijp∗
i.
Note that factor returns for industry i in this case depend only on international prices
and tariﬀs for industry i, and thus εwijtk = εwijp∗
k =0when k 6= i. If, on the other hand, (18)
is not binding in equilibrium, then p∗
iti does not enter into the arguments for determination
of wages or factor use of any industry, so that
εwijti = εwijp∗
i =0 .
11H o w e v e r ,t h e r em a ys t i l lb ei n c o m ee ﬀects arising from the impact that tariﬀs on other
industries can have on income levels Y and thus on demand for industry i’s good, so that:
εwijp∗
k = εwijtk − εwijY
1
1 − FIY −
P
l P∗
l (tl − 1)Ml
Y
mk for k 6= i.( 1 9 )
The results related to the general wage bargaining problem are summarized in
Proposition 3 Let wage-setting in industry i be deﬁned by the solution to (15)-(18). At any
solution to this problem:
(i) if εwijpk exists and(18) is binding then εwijtk = εwijp∗
k for all i,j.F u r t h e r m o r e , εwijtk =
εwijp∗
k =0when k 6= i.
(ii) If εwijpk and εwijY exist and (18) is not binding, then εwijtk = εwijp∗
k =0when k = i.
Furthermore, εwijp∗







mk when k 6= i.
2.3.1 A simple example
The above model of wage bargaining is too general to allow us to draw testable empirical
implications. In order to get an idea of the basic mechanisms at work in the wage bargaining
framework, we specialize to a simple two factor model (j = {l,k}) in which the production
technology is Leontieﬀ and income eﬀects on factor supply are absent. Firm proﬁts are:
πi =( pi(qi) − wli − wr)Bli,
where wr is the market interest rate. We assume that p∗
iti − wr > wl, so that there
eﬀectively exist rents over which to bargain. Bargaining takes place between the ﬁrm and a
domestic union which seeks to maximize:
Ui =( wli − wl)δBli.
The equilibrium will be given by the solution of the Generalized Nash Bargaining problem:
Max
li,wi






iti,w li ≥ wl.




















λwli (wli − wl)=0 (23)
F i r s tw el o o ka tt h ec a s ew h e r eλli =0 .A s l o n g a s p0(Bli) < 0, p(Bli) > wr + wl is




wli =( 1 − γ)(p(Bli) − wr)+γwl.
where θ =
p−wli−wr
p ≤ 1 denotes the markup and γ = a
a+(1−a)δ.γ is increasing in a and
decreasing in δ, so it forms a combined measure of the bargaining power of capital and the
relevance of employment for the union. Note that neither p∗
i nor ti enter into this system of
equations, so that changes in trade restrictions (or in the terms of trade) will have no eﬀect
on internal equilibrium (εwjiti = εwjip∗
i =0 ).
Now look at the solutions in which λli > 0,s ot h a tp(Bli)=p∗
iti.I n t h a t c a s e p∗
iti−wr >




wli =( 1 − γ)(p∗
iti − wr)+γwl.
Given that wki = p∗
iti − wli, a few steps of algebra help establish that:






(γwl − (1 − γ)wk). (24)
This term will be positive when γ > γ0 = wk
wl+wk, and negative otherwise. In other
words, if the bargaining power of capital is high or the disagreement between the union and
the capitalists’s objectives is low, then protection will increase the return to capital relative
to labor; otherwise it will enhance the relative return to labor. Equation (24) thus suggests
a pair of intersting testable implications that will be evaluated in our empirical section.
133 Estimation
In this section we will provide an illustration of our empirical method using data on the
shares of labor and capital income in aggregate factor income taken from United Nations
(2000), which compiles national accounts statistics elaborated according to its System of
National Accounts for 117 countries. Data on import duties, export taxes and trade/GDP
ratios come from World Bank (2002). The terms of trade variable is constructed as the
quotient of the GDP deﬂators for export and import prices from the national accounts data.
Depending on the speciﬁcation, our baseline regressions cover between 88 and 103 countries.
The data are divided into ﬁve-year averages for the 1960-1999 period, in order to diminish
the possible contamination from business cycle eﬀects. We use import and export volume
data for every country at the 2-digit level from the COMTRADE database (United Nations,
2004) to construct an index of international market power by country. This index is simply
the weighted average of the country’s export (import) share in world exports (imports) by
product, where the weights are the product’s share in the country’s exports (imports). We
deﬁne a country as large of it has a value greater than 0.1 in either the export-based or the
import-based index. The resulting list of large countries includes 7 economies: USA, Japan,
Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK and Canada.9
Section 2 has described the links between international prices, trade restrictions and
domestic factor prices that arise in the general case of many commodities and goods. The
data that we will use in our paper refer to the shares in national income accounts of two
factors of production, which, following convention, we call capital (k)a n dl a b o r( l). The
ﬁrst necessary step in order to set up our estimation strategy is to transform our results into
testable implications regarding the shares of these two factors in aggregate income.
9An eight economy (South Africa) also appears as large in this index because it accounts for 60% of world
exports and 29% of world imports of commodity class S2-93 ”Special transactions, commodity not classiﬁed
according to class. ” This is an artifact of the large level of unclassiﬁed trade occurring in the South African
Customs Union and is not indicative of any signiﬁcant level of market power. We tried other speciﬁcations
(with and without South Africa and using other thresholds for market power), with none of them yielding
signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the speciﬁcation reported.

















































































Equations (27) and (28) lead us to the following estimation speciﬁcation:
g(αrt)=β0 + β1 lnprt + β2 lnτrt + β3 lnkrt + β4 lnbrt + θr + λt + εrt, (29)
where r =1 ,2,...,Rdenotes countries and t =1 ,2,...,T time periods. θr and λt are country
and period ﬁxed eﬀects, prt is a terms of trade measure (the ratio of export to import prices),
τrt is the ratio of import to export duties, krt = Bkrt/Blrt is the relative endowment of
capital, brt is a time-varying country-speciﬁc control designed to capture the potential bias
arising from income and εrt ∼ iid(0,σ2
ε). We prefer this speciﬁcation over the alternative
of constructing measures of factor prices using factor shares and factor endowment data, as
measurement error in lnBk/Bl would bias any eﬀect of trade restrictions on factor prices
towards zero. For a similar measurement problem in the context of an earnings equation see
Bound et. al. (1994).
15Several points are worth noting with respect to this speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst one is that our





as the dependent variable. This functional form is derived above from the accounting identity
(25) and has the implication that the coeﬃcients of lnpit and lnτit will be equal to the
elasticities that Proposition 1-3 refer to, regardless of the functional forms taken by the
unit cost and factor supply functions. A more common approach in the literature is to
derive the equation to be estimated form the translog speciﬁcation for the GDP function
(see Kohli, 1990, 1991). This speciﬁcation can cause severe consistency problems if the
translog functional form is incorrect. The reason is that by deﬁnition factor shares are
bounded between 0 and 1, and when estimating an equation like (29), standard assumptions
about the disturbance εrt (such as normality) require an unbounded support, something that
is in contradiction with the dependent variable being restricted to the unit interval. The
logit transform of the dependent variable (as suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993)
allows it to take on values anywhere on the real line. Although this fact is well understood
in the context of linear probability models with unbounded explanatory variables, it is often
disregarded in other applied settings (for an exception, see Emmons and Schmid, 2000). The
choice of speciﬁcation, however, is not crucial to our results, and we provide below estimates
for the more common tranlog GDP function functional form.
A second point that we wish to call attention to is that our terms of trade indicator is
by deﬁnition country-speciﬁc, as it is built using prices of exports and imports taken from
national income accounts. Therefore these indexes are not comparable across countries,
making the cross-sectional variation among them meaningless. This is the reason for which
we do not present random eﬀect estimates in our results10.
In the third place, the results of Propositions 1-3 form the backbone of our identiﬁca-
tion strategy. In particular, we assume that εwkp∗
i − εwlp∗
i provides a reasonable estimate of
εwkti − εwlti,a sl o n ga st h ep o t e n t i a lb i a sa r i s i n gf r o mi n c o m ee ﬀects is appropriately con-
trolled for. The theoretical results support the argument that this is a reasonable assumption
for a broad subset of theories of international trade that subsumes the theories that we want
to evaluate, such as Stolper-Samuelson and wage bargaining. In this sense, our approach of
10Hausmann speciﬁcation tests without the price variable also favor the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
16identiﬁcation through theory is similar to that of authors like Levitt and Porter (2001), who
impose reasonable restrictions on observed behavior of individual agents in order to derive
identiﬁcation assumptions, and contrasts with the use of instrumental variables with exoge-
nous instruments common in cross-country empirical studies and perhaps best exempliﬁed
by contributions such as those of Frankel and Romer (2000) and Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001).
Notice that we do not impose the restriction that β1 = −β2 in our model, which is what
our identiﬁcation assumption may be taken to imply. The reason is that if τrt is endogenous,
β2 will be diﬃcult to estimate empirically and imposing such a restriction will bias our
estimate of β1. Instead, we know that as long as we restrict ourselves to the case of small
countries, shocks to prt will be exogenous to the process determining income shares within
an economy, so E[prtεrt]=0 , guaranteeing identiﬁcation of β1 even if E[τrtεrt] 6=0 , provided
appropriate controls for ln(Bk/Bl) and brt are included11.
The endogeneity of τrt may still cause diﬃculties for our approach if it is also correlated
with the exogenous terms of trade measure. In that case, the endogeneity τrt contaminates
the coeﬃcient estimate of lnprt in (29) despite the fact that E[prtεrt]=0 . As an illustration,
suppose there exists a relationship between the trade policy variable and the terms of trade
of the form lnτrt = α0 + α1 lnprt + α2κrt + δr + νrt, where the error term in equation (29)
is related to κrt by εrt = γκrt + urt with urt ∼ iid(0,σ2). These expressions describe the
endogeneity of trade restriccions through the ommited variable κrt. After the appropriate































Estimating (30) would yield a biased and inconsistent estimate of β1 if α1 6=0 .T h i si m p l i e s
that for the estimation procedure to identify the eﬀect of the policy variable on income shares,
11For obvious reasons, we restrict ourselves to addressing and solving the problems for estimation that could
be caused by endogeneity of the trade policy variable. We therefore assume that all the other controls in
equation (29) are uncorrelated with the error term.
17it is important that the exogenous variable be uncorrelated with the endogenous variable of
interest.
Fortunately, whether this is the fact or not can be veriﬁed by running a regression of
lnτrt on lnprt, κrt and a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects. Since we can safely assume exogeneity
of lnprt, such a regression allows us to accurately estimate α1 as long as the relevant κrt are
controlled for. This regression would be analogous to the ﬁrst-stage regressions common
in implementations of instrumental variables techniques. But unlike conventional ﬁrst-stage
regressions, the necessary condition for the validity of our approach would be established
by failing to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for lnprt. I ti so n l yi nt h i sw a yt h a tw ec a nb e
certain that the coeﬃcient estimate on lnprt in (30) will not be contaminated by the potential
endogeneity of (30) (i.e., that α1 =0 )
Such a set of regressions is reported in Table 1. We report equations for the whole sample
and for sample splits distinguishing poor and rich countries, as well as with and without a
full set of controls. Both the criteria for splitting the sample and the list of controls parallel
those used in the estimates of (30) reported below. The results conﬁrm a lack of association
between the terms of trade indicator and the trade policy variable: the coeﬃcient on lnprt
is never signiﬁcant, and the lowest p-value it attains is 0.303.
It is worth noting that one advantage of our approach over the IV approach is that it
allows us to get away from the small-sample bias of instrumental variables estimators. As
is well-know, instrumental variables estimators are consistent, but they are also biased (see
Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993). Cross country datasets are naturally of limited size, so
inference based on IV estimates is weak at best. Our approach, in contrast, provides an
estimate that is both consistent and unbiased under the aforementioned models. This makes
inference about the eﬀects of a policy variable such as trade policy much more reliable.
A fourth point refers to the appropriate way to control for brt, the bias arising from the
possible existence of income eﬀects. It will be noted that equations like (12) show a highly
non-linear term in all parameters of the system, presenting a formidable estimation problem
given its generality. There are, however, two simple ways in which we can control for this
bias. One possibility comes from noting that equation (10) allows us to rewrite the bias as:
−(εwkY − εwlY )(εYp i − εYt i), (31)
18which shows that the bias is caused by the indirect eﬀect that tariﬀs and external prices have
on relative factor returns through Y .T h e s ee ﬀects are due to fact that the only place in the
system of equations determining w where p∗
i and ti do not enter multiplicatively is in the
equation for Y , (9). (31) therefore suggests controlling for Y when we estimate a regression
of g(α) on p∗
i. An alternative comes from taking a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of (12)











an expression which is proportional to mi. (32) implies that an appropriate way to control
for the bias is to introduce an interaction term between lnpit and mi in the regresion. Given
that when mi < 0, ti corresponds to an export subsidy, the appropriate empirical counterpart
of mi is the share of exports plus imports in GDP.
One last point that we wish to emphasize is that the nature of our data naturally limits
its ability to deal with the eﬀects of trade policy on the distribution of income when there are
more than two factors of production. The results that follow should be read as a comparative
evaluation of the explanatory power of two-factor models of international trade. Despite this
limitation, there is nothing in our empirical strategy that impedes its application to multi-
factor contexts, and we view our exercise as illustrative of the possibilities inherent in our
approach rather than as a deﬁnitive evaluation of existing theories.
3.1 Results
Table 2 displays the results of our ﬁrst attempt to test for the existence of Stolper-Samuelson
eﬀects in the data. Recall that the coeﬃc i e n to fi n t e r e s ti st h eo n eo nt h et e r m so ft r a d e
variable, which should be positive for capital abundant economies and negative for labor-
abundant economies. In this table, we use per capita GDP as our indicator of capital-
abundance; we explore other measures below. According to (31), controlling for per capita
GDP also allows us to take care of income eﬀects. We estimate the coeﬃcient through two
speciﬁcations: in the ﬁrst one (columns 1 and 2) we split the sample into labor-abundant and
capital-abundant countries,12 while in the second one (column 3) we introduce an interaction
12A country is labor (capital) abundant if its per capita GDP is below (above) world per capita GDP.
19term between the capital abundance indicator and the terms of trade variable. Columns 4-6
repeat these regressions but with an additional direct control for the bias term bkl,w h i c hi sa n
interaction term between the trade share and the terms of trade variable, as suggested by (28).
These ﬁrst results should be disappointing for Stolper-Samuelson advocates. The coeﬃcient
on the terms of trade variable is insigniﬁcant and has the wrong sign for labor-abundant
countries regardless of whether the direct control for bkl is introduced or not. For capital-
abundant countries, there is a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, as expected by theory, in
column 2, but it disappears and becomes negative though not signiﬁcant as soon as the bias
control term is introduced, with that term being strongly signiﬁcant. As to the interaction
term between terms of trade and capital abundance, it is insigniﬁcant and the sign becomes
negative when the bias control is introduced.
Table 3 conﬁrms the results of Table 2 using the conventional translog-GDP function
approach, which has the capital share (instead of the logit transform) as the dependent
variable. The results are very similar in terms of sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients on the terms of trade, with the only substantial diﬀerence being that the sign of the
terms of trade variable in the regression for capital-abundant countries with the bias control
now becomes signiﬁcantly negative, in contradiction to the expected positive coeﬃcient.
In a recent paper, Gollin (2002) has argued that standard national accounting signiﬁcantly
misrepresents income shares by classifying income from self-employment as capital income.
Therefore some countries may falsely appear to have high capital shares due to the existence
of a large informal sector. Gollin produces a set of adjustments to income shares for a
reduced subset of economies for which data on the income from unincorporated enterprises
is available. In order to make sure that our results are not due to the bias arising from
this misclassiﬁcation of self-employment, we repeat our tests of Tables 2 and 3 on the Gollin
data.13 None of the six coeﬃcients reported in this table are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Some comfort may be taken from the fact that all but one of the coeﬃcients have the
sign indicated by theory; on the other hand the coeﬃcients are very far from conventional
13We use Gollin’s ﬁrst adjustment, which imputes all income from unincorporated enterprises as labor
income. Results are similar if one uses his second adjustment (impute same labor share as the rest of the
economy); his third adjustment (which imputes a wage for proprietors and self-employed individuals), however,
yields insuﬃcient observations for our estimation.
20signiﬁcance levels (the average p-value for the six coeﬃcients of interest is 0.67).
One possible explanation for these results is that some countries may be completely
specialized in a subset of goods, invalidating the assumption of factor price equalization that
is the backbone of the Stolper-Samuelson model. Fortunately, factor price equalization is not
a necessary condition for our identiﬁcation assumptions to be valid, allowing us to apply to
modiﬁed versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that apply in a setting of multiple cones
of diversiﬁcation. As shown by Davis (1996) and Xu (2000), among others, what is relevant
in a world of multiple cones of diversiﬁcation is a country’s level of capital abundance relative
to its cone of diversiﬁcation. Table 5 makes a ﬁrst attempt to address this issue: in it we split
the sample further into two groups, corresponding respectively to above and below world
per-capita GDP. This would correspond with the existence of two symmetrically distributed
cones of diversiﬁc a t i o n . W i t h i ne a c hc o n e ,w er u nt h es a m es i xr e g r e s s i o n sa si nT a b l e s2 - 4 .
For the capital-abundant cone, four of the six coeﬃcients have the wrong sign, one of them
being signiﬁcant, while for the labor-abundant cone, none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
and two have the wrong sign.
A potential problem with this test is that it assumes the existence of two cones of diver-
siﬁcation, while theory oﬀers no guide as to the number of cones of diversiﬁcation nor to the
dividing points between them. One way to address this issue is by trying to ﬁnd whether
there is evidence of a cone of diversiﬁcation of any size at each extreme of the distribution
of capital abundance. Figures 2 and 3 show our attempt to do so. Figure 2 graphs the
coeﬃcient and t-statistics on the interaction between the log of the terms of trade and the
log of per capita GDP taken from a regression identical to that reported in columns 6 and
12 of Table 5, but run for all possible deﬁnitions of the cone of diversiﬁcation corresponding
to the highest range of capital-abundance. This means running 168 regressions, ranging
from the most restrictive deﬁnition of the capital-abundant cone (the one with the minimum
number of observations for which the regression can be run) to the most inclusive one (the
whole sample). Figure 3 does the same thing, but ranging from the most to least restrictive
deﬁnition for the labor-abundant cone. Recall that this interaction term should be positive
if the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds. Figure 2 shows a striking fact: the coeﬃcient on
the interaction is never signiﬁcant and positive for any possible deﬁnition of the highest
21capital-abundant cone of diversiﬁcation. In the range in which the interaction is signiﬁcant
(a range corresponding to 16-18 economies) the coeﬃcient is actually negative, indicating
that the eﬀect of trade on returns to capital decreases as capital intensity increases within
the cone. Figure 3 shows a similar fact for the lowest range of capital-abundance: with
the not very relevant exception of the ﬁrst regression (which has one degree of freedom), no
o t h e rr e g r e s s i o ni nt h i sﬁgure displays a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, be it of the correct or incorrect
sign. Additional tests (not reported) replicate these results when we split each cone between
its capital-abundant and labor-abundant countries: for no deﬁnition of the most and least
capital-abundant cones of diversiﬁcation is there a regression in which both coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant and of the right sign.
In Table 6 we address some logical questions that might arise about our speciﬁcation.
In the ﬁrst place, we have used per capita GDP above as a control for capital abundance.
This is an admittedly rough measure of capital abundance. The ﬁrst three columns of
Table 6 repeat our regressions using the Summers-Heston (1992) estimates of the capital
stock with the bias control term. Note that as these are unavailable in the latest version of
the Penn World Tables and are only compiled for a reduced number of countries, we lose a
signiﬁcant number of observations when using this indicator: the number of countries in the
labor-abundant group fall from 42 to 20 and those in the capital-abundant group from 46 to
21. None of the three coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and two have the wrong sign. The rest
of the columns experiment with additional speciﬁcations: columns 4-6 use Barro and Lee’s
(2004) measure of terms of trade instead of our national accounts based data; columns 7-9
use the share of imports and exports in GDP as our policy indicator, while columns 10-12
return to our baseline speciﬁcation but add a set of alternative controls: for the level of
human capital (measured by the average years of secondary and higher schooling, the level of
political liberties and the right to bargain collectively. None of these additional speciﬁcations
particularly seem to favor Stolper-Samuelson: only two out of the nine speciﬁcations in
columns 4-12 have the right sign, and none of them are signiﬁcant.
Given the disappointing performance of the Stolper-Samuelson hypothesis on our data, we
turn in Table 7 to identifying whether there is evidence of an eﬀect of trade on domestic factor
prices that operates through the wage bargaining channel. As we showed in Section 2.3, the
22eﬀect of trade restrictions on factor shares should vary according to the relative bargaining
power of capital and labor. Therefore, we should expect to see trade increasing capital
shares in countries where labor organization is strong, whereas the opposite would happen
where it is weak. We use unionization rates from Rama and Artecona (2000) as our measure
of the degree of labor organization. Thus we introduce into the speciﬁcation an interaction
between unionization levels and the log of the terms of trade variable. Since we are interested
in testing the wage bargaining model on its own (as opposed to a combination of it and the
Stolper-Samuelson model), the speciﬁcation in Table 7 assumes that the coeﬃcient on terms
of trade is the same for poor and rich countries14. We present six possible speciﬁcations
in this regression, corresponding to the three dependent variables in Tables 2-4, with and
without alternative controls. All of the estimates are positive, with three of them signiﬁcant
at 5%. Even the non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are reasonably close to statistical signiﬁcance
(p-values of .11, .29 and .14). The estimated eﬀects are economically very signiﬁcant: the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term in equation 2, for example, implies that a country with a
unionization rate of 25.7% (the average of the sample) that raised tariﬀs from their free trade
level to an average level of 50% would see an increase of 5.9 percent of GDP in labor’s share
relative to a country with no unions.
These results suggest that there may be something to the wage bargaining story. Cer-
tainly, if viewed as a horse race between Stolper-Samuelson and wage bargaining theories,
wage bargaining has managed to leave Stolper-Samuelson behind, though partly thanks to
Stolper-Samuelson not running very fast (or, actually, that it seemed to be running in the
wrong direction). A fuller analysis of the empirical implications of the wage bargaining hy-
pothesis is beyond the scope of our paper. It is possible of course that unionization be
proxying for other variables that aﬀect the trade-income distribution link. There may also
be problems of selection bias in the reporting of unionization data15. However, the fact
that a simple wage-bargaining theory does much better than neoclassical trade theory in this
initial horse race suggests that much of the eﬀort directed at understanding the causes of
14Tests allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients accoding to levels of income and capital intensity generate similar
results. Details are available upon request.
15A simple selection model using real per capita GDP as the selection variable for non-missing values yields
similar results.
23factor price movements may have been misplaced.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has proposed a simple strategy for identifying the eﬀect of trade restrictions on
relative factor prices. In contrast to the common approach in the cross-national empirical lit-
erature, which addresses problems of identiﬁcation by instrumenting on sources of exogenous
variation in policy variables, we derive our identiﬁcation assumptions directly from theory.
As we have shown, a broad class of trade theories implies that the elasticity of factor returns
with respect to a tariﬀ on good i should be identical to that with respect to an increase in
the price of good i. Even when these elasticities are not the same, theory suggests a way in
which we can quantify and control for the bias that could arise when we estimate the former
using the latter. The plausibility of the assumption of exogeneity of terms of trade changes
when the sample is restricted to small economies and the empirically veriﬁable fact that trade
policy and terms of trade are not correlated give us an opportunity to estimate the eﬀect of a
policy variable using information on an exogenous variable, while at the same time avoiding
the small-sample bias of instrumental variables.
We have implemented our strategy on a cross-national panel of data on factor shares and
trade policy for more than one hundred economies. Our results are not supportive of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. As we have shown, Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects are very hard to
ﬁnd in the data, regardless of whether we look for them at the world level or at the level of
speciﬁc cones of diversiﬁcation. In contrast, we do ﬁnd evidence in the data that conﬁrms the
predictions of wage-bargaining models whereby economic integration weakens the bargaining
power of unions.
Our results are naturally limited by the nature of our data, which reports income distrib-
ution for only two factors of production. One explanation for the disappointing results could
be that they are due to the incapacity of two-factor models for understanding the reaction of
factor prices to international trade. Indeed, our results can be seen as conﬁrming the exten-
sive empirical literature that has systematically failed to conﬁrm the empirical predictions
of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model. The methodology presented in this paper, however,
24is applicable to multi-factor, multi-good contexts, suggesting a natural direction for future
research.
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28Table 1. "First Stage" Regressions
12 345 6
Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich
Ln(Terms of Trade) -0.006 0.001 0.022 0.022 0.036 0.080
(0.019) (0.028) (0.021) (0.055) (0.102) (0.120)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(High Union Dummy) 0.003* 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
High Union Dummy 0.000* 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.024 -0.040 0.006
(0.030) (0.063) (0.036)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) -0.001* -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Political Rights -0.013*** -0.022* -0.008*
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Secondary Schooling -0.000 0.100 -0.008
(0.012) (0.098) (0.008)
Higher Level Schooling -0.001 -0.12 0.037
(0.083) (0.223) (0.070)
Bargaining Rights 0.073 0.293 0.037
(0.068) (0.206) (0.051)
N. Observations 482 265 201 199 92 107
Countries 124 77 56 69 38 36
F-Test F(123, 352) F(76, 182) F(55, 139) F(68, 117) F(37, 41) F(35, 58)
13.3 7.29 17.68 6.15 4.27 7.36
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,
          and 1% levels, respectivelyTable 2. Baseline Specification
12 3 45 6
Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample
Ln(Terms of Trade) 0.182 0.300** -0.148 0.607 -0.483 0.147
(0.160) (0.143) (0.886) 0.368 (0.324) (0.910)
Import Duties / Export Duties -0.995* 0.801 -2.928 -0.789 0.932 -1.146
(0.522) (0.667) (2.682) (0.531) (0.649) (2.757)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.445** 0.076 -0.302*** -0.378* 0.000 -0.276**
(0.195) (0.157) (0.114) (0.196) (0.155) (0.114)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(ImpDut/ExpDut) 0.339 0.136
(0.332) (0.340)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade) 0.046 -0.010
(0.106) (0.107)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) -0.006 0.013*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
N. Observations 107 153 260 104 153 257
Countries 42 46 78 42 46 78
F-Test F(8,57) F(8,99) F(10,172) F(9,53) F(9,98) F(11,168)
2.14 1.22 1.99 1.61 1.95 1.71
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,
          and 1% levels, respectivelyTable 3. Translog specification
12 3 45 6
Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample
Ln(Terms of Trade) 0.046 0.072** -0.029 0.135 -0.124* 0.008
(0.036) (0.031) (0.195) (0.084) 0.069 (0.202)
Import Duties / Export Duties -0.198* 0.166 -0.577 -0.165 0.199 -0.253
(0.117) (0.144) (0.592) (0.122) (0.138) (0.612)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.092** 0.010 -0.068*** -0.081* -0.008 -0.064**
(0.044) (0.034) (0.025) (0.045) (0.033) (0.025)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(ImpDut/ExpDut) 0.067 0.030
(0.073) (0.075)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade) 0.010 0.000
(0.023) (0.024)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) -0.001 0.003*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. Observations 107 153 260 104 153 257
Countries 42 46 78 42 46 78
F-Test F(8,57) F(8,99) F(10,172) F(9,53) F(9,98) F(11,168)
2.00 1.22 1.98 1.56 2.28 1.77
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,Table 4. Gollin's Adjustment
1 234 56
Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample
Ln(Terms of Trade) 0.066 0.601 -0.155 -0.174 1.991 -0.650
(0.206) (0.538) (3.895) (1.116) (1.841) (3.955)
Import Duties / Export Duties -3.137 -3.569 -23.616 -2.989 -4.646 -12.606
(2.563) (3.831) (25.225) (3.599) (4.095) (28.448)
Ln(Per capita GDP) 2.403** 0.440 0.414 2.319 0.332 0.565
(0.292) (0.492) (0.430) (0.550) (0.514) (0.467)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(ImpDut/ExpDut) 2.409 1.277
(2.843) (3.150)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade) 0.087 0.037
(0.438) (0.444)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) 0.004 -0.021 0.014
(0.019) (0.026) (0.017)
N. Observations 17 44 61 17 44 61
Countries 8 13 20 8 13 20
F-Test F(7,2) F(7,24) F(9,32) F(8,1) F(8,23) F(10,31)
30.05 3.45 5.40 13.81 3.05 4.89
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,Table 5. Two Cones of Diversification 12 3 4 5 6 78 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample
Ln(Terms of Trade) 0.460* -0.067 2.997 -0.805 0.068 2.136 0.082 0.192 -0.090 1.811 0.455 0.484
(0.228) (0.217) (4.835) (0.493) (0.517) (4.696) (0.322) (0.240) (1.881) (1.217) (0.529) (1.958)
Import Duties / Export Duties -0.830 0.608 18.610 -0.183 0.582 19.251 -2.240* -0.806 -0.696 -2.487 -0.711 0.503
(1.166) (0.800) (13.183) (1.091) (0.812) (12.777) (1.108) (0.686) (4.789) (1.361) (0.719) (5.332)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.283 0.004 0.141 -0.373 0.033 0.068 -2.009 -0.344 -0.439** -1.218 -0.331 -0.354
(0.249) (0.248) (0.170) (0.230) (0.269) (0.167) (1.248) (0.216) (0.214) (1.516) (0.221) (0.221)
Ln(Per Capita GDP)*(ImpDut/ExpDut) -1.936 -1.991 -0.037 -0.171
(1.424) (1.380) (0.637) (0.707)
Ln(Per Capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade) -0.296 -0.288 0.036 0.012
(0.524) (0.508) (0.252) (0.275)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) 0.021*** -0.002 0.013*** -0.031 -0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006)
N. Observations 75 78 153 75 78 153 35 72 107 33 71 104
Countries 31 18 46 31 18 46 16 26 42 16 26 42
F-Test F(8,36) F(8,52) F(10,97) F(9,35) F(9,51) F(11,96) F(7,12) F(8,38) F(10,55) F(8,9) F(9,36) F(11,51)
1.12 3.71 1.21 2.09 3.24 1.83 1.5 1.04 1.66 1.08 0.88 1.28
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Capital Abundant Cone Labor Abundant ConeTable 6. Alternative specifications
12 3 45 6
Poor Rich Whole Sample Poor Rich Whole Sample
Ln(Terms of Trade) -0.484 -0.053 -0.007
(0.505) (0.501) (0.844)
Import Duties / Export Duties -0.413 1.373* -6.961*** -1.367 0.465 -2.046
(0.705) (0.719) (2.454) (0.921) (0.947) (5.628)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.994*** 0.327 -0.505*** -0.459 0.030 -0.486*
(0.292) (0.299) (0.192) (0.405) (0.442) (0.288)
Ln(Capital per Worker) 0.348 -0.097 -0.061
(0.274) (0.248) (0.187)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) 0.014 0.004 0.010*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.282)
Ln(Capital per Worker)*(Imp.Dut/Exp.Dut) 0.813***
(0.087)
Ln(Capital per Worker)*(Terms of Trade) -0.051
(0.006)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade)
Ln(Terms of Trade Barro-Lee) 3.941 -1.247 6.882
(2.963) (2.037) (7.793)
Ln(Terms of Trade Barro-Lee)*(Trade Share) -0.057 0.010 -0.008
(0.044) (0.020) (0.017)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Terms of Trade Barro-Lee) -0.658
(0.936)
Ln(Per capita GDP)*(Imp.Dut/Exp.Dut) 0.177
(0.671)
Trade Share





N. Observations 64 86 150 53 57 110
Countries 20 21 38 33 30 59
F-Test F(19, 35) F(20, 56) F(37, 101) F(32, 14) F(29, 21) F(58, 43)
18.05 16.64 29.25 10.21 12.36 14.22
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,
          and 1% levels, respectivelyTable 7. Unionization interactions
123456
Ln(Terms of Trade) -0.510 -0.433 -0.105 -0.089 -0.333 -0.713
(0.376) (0.484) (0.083) (0.106) (1.211) (1.169)
Import Duties / Export Duties 0.643 0.911 0.115 0.213 -13.585 -7.618
(0.913) (0.944) (0.201) (0.206) (9.934) (9.085)
Ln(Per capita GDP) -0.520*** -0.486*** -0.126*** -0.121*** 0.814 0.875*
(0.147) (0.182) (0.032) (0.040) (0.516) (0.472)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*(Trade Share) 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.018) (0.017)
Political Rights 0.098*** 0.021*** 0.176**
(0.033) (0.007) (0.071)
Secondary Schooling -0.066 -0.013 0.090
(0.050) (0.011) (0.088)
Higher Level Schooling 1.148*** 0.258*** -0.896
(0.417) (0.091) (0.875)
Bargaining Rights 0.207 0.043 -0.189
(0.284) (0.062) (0.359)
(Imp.Dut/Exp.Dut)*Unionization Rate -0.059* -0.067* -0.011* -0.014* 0.188 0.224
(0.032) (0.035) (0.007) (0.008) (0.200) (0.182)
Ln(Terms of Trade)*Unionization Rate 0.010 0.022** 0.001 0.005** 0.045** 0.029
(0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.020) (0.019)
Unionization Rate 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
N. Observations 147 123 147 123 52 52
Countries 49 42 49 42 18 18
F-Test F(48, 86) F(41, 66) F(48, 86) F(41, 66) F(17, 23) F(17, 19)
22.4 20.15 23.41 21.78 7.02 6.9
H0: (All coefficients are zero) Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
Note: Large Countries (excluded from the sample) are USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, UK
          and Canada
         Standard errors are in parentheses.*,** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%,
          and 1% levels, respectively
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